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The Russian-European Revolutionary Contest before 1871 (Third Rome)

Source: Katehon By Michail Agursky

After the short-lived French continental domination under Napoleon Bonaparte, a new balance of European power was established. Several of Europe’s great powers contributed, but only in 1871 was the final constellation of forces achieved. (That year has been called by Nissan Oren the year of pivotal change in world history due to “the imposition of Prussian hegemony over the Germanies under Bismarck. Indeed, instead of the loose German Confederation, consisting of almost 300 monarchies and cities, an extremely powerful country emerged that shifted not only the European but also the world balance of power. France, which saw itself as the strongest European continental power, was humiliatingly defeated.

Germany was not merely another new powerful country. With Prussia as its foundation, it absorbed the most advanced world military tradition, which boasted of an unbroken sequence of victories. Prussian militarism became the German raison d’être. (Let us take into consideration that the process of German unification had not yet been completed by 1871, as many Germans lived in the Austro-Hungarian empire and elsewhere). Europe was shocked by the manifestation of German military power and German self-assertiveness, which had ruined the previous balance of power and had caused various changes in traditional European alliances.

The Russian empire was the largest in the world, larger even than that of the USSR today, since it included Poland, Finland, present-day Alaska, and Turkish Armenia. Throughout its history, Russia had expanded in every possible direction, stopping only when faced by resistance. Russia already controlled the Far East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus; impinged on the borders of China, Persia, and Afghanistan; and threatened British India

In the West, Russia’s progress was barred by Germany and Austria-Hungary, but the Ottoman empire seemed to be a new natural prey. Whatever explanation there is for persistent expansion, Russia was regarded as a most important great power, regardless of its inefficiency. Although no Russian ruler made any public statement in favor of Russian world domination, it was widely believed in the West that the country did in fact strive in this direction.

At the end of the eighteenth century, a document known aa the “Testament of Peter the Great” began to circulate in the West.2 The authenticity of this document is doubtful, but nevertheless many people, both in the West and in Russia, regarded it as authentic or even, according to Marx and Engels, aa a rationalization of Russian foreign policy. In spite of its doubtful authenticity, the Testament did have a powerful impact as it listed in great detail the variety of ways by which Russia would come to dominate the world, militarily and politically.

As a result, many European politicians and thinkers were persuaded that Russia posed a geopolitical threat that must be contained. An intense anti- Russian obsession, bordering even on frenzy, developed, and it reached its greatest peak of intensity in German lands.1 Both Prussia and Austria- Hungary had large Slav populations and regarded them as kin to the Russians, although this Slavic kinship was only a political chimera. Apart from a certain linguistic affinity, there was almost no link between Slav nations. However, the fear of a successful Pan-Slavic movement, which could destroy Austria-Hungary, cause the rebellion of Prussian Poles, and bring Russia into the conflict as the chief protector of the Slavs, was sufficient to create intense anti-Russian feeling in Prussia and Austria- Hungary. In feet, the collapse of Austria-Hungary would have been a most serious threat to Germany as well. A Pan-Slavic movement, among the Czechs, for example, could have brought the Russians as near as Bayern— where they now are, by the way. One must also keep in mind the already quite deep penetration of Russia into German political life via various dynastic intermarriages long before German unification under Bismarck.

Therefore, it was vitally important for Germany to keep Austria-Hungry as a buffer to guard the Slav population from any possible Russian penetration. An intense Russophobia permeated German circles, balanced to only a very small extent by Russophobia. This Russophobia reached a height for which there was no rational explanation and was verbalized in the concept of the so-called Teuton-Slav confrontation, which was regarded as existential, even racial, rather than political.1 Prussian militarists regarded the Teuton-Slav antagonism as a basic conflict to be solved sooner or later in mortal combat They saw no political solution to this confrontation, which was part of the concept of a larger German race-cult that emerged in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century and which, as Leon Poliakov said, “has no analogy in any other country. None of the varieties of European nationalism which were beginning to compete with each other at the time assumed this biologically oriented form. Between 1790 and 1815 with practically no transition, writers moved on from the idea of a specifically German mission to the glorification of the language, and from there to glorification of German blood.”5

This was only one side of the coin. What happened in Russia? Although many Germans anticipated the Slav threat and an inevitable Teuton-Slav confrontation, there was a massive German penetration into Russia that was over and above any imagined Russian penetration into the German world. The migration was in only one direction, eastward: Drang nach Osten. Since the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great had invited many German experts and advisers to modernize his empire and help him conquer the Baltic states, Russia had been inundated with Germans, who quickly became a most influential and skilled power group. It Is Ironic thatthe previously noted Russian penetration of German political life was mirrored by Germany to the extent that the formerly ethnic Russian ruling dynasty had become gradually Germanized: The eighteenth-century Catherine II was a German princess with no Russian blood at all.

At times, Germans completely dominated Russian politics, which does not mean, however, that they pursued a pro-German policy. Not only did united Germany not yet exist, but Russia itself at that time seemed like a large German principate, similar to Austria, which also controlled many non-Germans. Later, the German presence in Russian political life declined, but it was always rather inflated until the 1917 revolution. The Russian court, the army, the diplomatic corps, and the civil service were all highly Germanized.

However, Baltic Germans were only a part of this German migration. Russia was an attraction for a variety of Germans, many of whom succeeded in military or political careers after their emigration to Russia, as for example, Karl Nesselrode (1780-1862), who became Russia’s foreign minister, and Egor Kankrin (1774-1845), who became finance minister. German peasant colonists were also included in the eighteenth-century invitations to set up progressive agriculture or to cultivate virgin lands, and they settled in the southern Ukraine, the Volga region, and in the Caucasus. The demographic strength of the Volga Germans permitted the creation of a separate Volga German autonomous republic after the Bolshevik revolution.

In 1897, there were 1,790,000 Germans in Russia as compared with approximately 56 million Russians, 22 million Ukrainians, 6 million Byelorussians, and just over 5.5 million Jews.6 On the eve of World War II, there were 170,000 German and 120,000 Austrian subjects in Russia, versus only 8,000 English and 10,000 French subjects.

In spite of Russian religious constraints, Protestantism and Catholicism were recognized in Russia as full-fledged Christian denominations, and their followers were granted all civil rights. Mixed marriages were also permitted between Orthodox Christians and Protestants or Roman Catholics, with the proviso that children born to these unions would be brought up as Orthodox Christians. In fact, Protestantism had gradually permeated Russian ecclesiastical education and had been exercising influence over the Russian Orthodox church ever since the time of Peter the Great (1672-1725). Also, many German peasant colonists belonged to various sects, and their influence in Russia gave birth to the powerful Baptist sectarian movement, which became the biggest concern of the Russian Orthodox church and survived the Bolshevik revolution. (We can note, for example, that in 1928 Baptiste accounted for about 25 percent of the population in the Donets Basin,and the Protestant youth organizations in all Russia had 1.7 million members in that year—more than the membership of the Communist youth organization, Komsomol.)9

After the Russian victory over France in 1812, the leading foreign cultural influence in Russia became that of the Germans, a natural development arising out of the encouragement given by the Russian authorities to Russian youth being educated in Germany rather than in France, as they were prior to 1812. In addition, the educated strata of Russian society were exposed to the strongest German influences: Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and others became the principal intellectual fare in Russia. Moreover, Russian economics was largely in German hands. Engels himself confirmed in 1891 that the Germans controlled almost all Russian trade and industry, at least in the second half of the nineteenth century.10

I have already noted the abnormality of Russian-German relations during this period—the obsessive fear of the Germans with regard to the fateful and inevitable Teuton-Slav confrontation together with the Germans’ own penetration into almost every aspect of Russian life. The Germans who migrated to Russia were certainly loyal Russian citizens, but their loyalty was to the tsar as his subjects only. A distinguished English scholar and leading foreign journalist in Russia, Emil Dillon (1854-1933), who represented the Daily Telegraph there for many years, made the following observation:

From those days onward, the Germans played a predominant part in the Russian civil administration, in the army and navy, at the court, in schools and universities, in science and letters, in journalism, in trade and industry, everywhere, in a word, except in the Church. They have often been accused of acquiring the defects of the Russians and of contributing to demoralise these. It is true that like the Russians they did not scruple to cheat the treasury when opportunity offered, but justice compels one to add that they had at least a certain sense of measure which the Russian bureaucrat too often lacked. They sometimes appropriated funds, but generally limited the sums to their actual needs instead of making them commensurate with their grandiose opportunities. They served their Russian sovereign loyally, favoured men of their own race and religion, and stamped a Teuton impress on most things in the Tsardom. In the army, in the navy, in the administration of provinces, in the central ministries, in the schools and universities, on the estates of the great landowners, at the head of factories, on the boards of companies and bonks, in apothecaries’ shops and bakeries—were Germans. Whithersoever you went the majority of the men who transacted Russia’s business, public and private, had German manners, spoke the German tongue; one must also confess that on the whole they did not disappoint the expectations of the Tsars who favoured and protected them11

Their “Russian” identity would be safely secured in the absence of any Russian-German notional confrontation. The unification of Germany in the 1870s changed this situation drastically.

Russian geopolitics is usually discussed in terms of East-West relations. To a certain extent, this orientation is correct, but during the period under discussion the East-West question can be reduced to its central problem, Russian-German relations, although this one aspect certainly does not cover all of the complexities of the situation. We will see later that the issue of the far-reaching Germanization of Russia was taboo in the Russian press due to censorship. The only outlet for the issue was the emigrant, or clandestine, press, and the most important generalizations on the subject were made after the revolution. Let us consider some of them, from completely different sources.

During his exile, Lev Trotsky (1879-1940) stressed that Russia was really ruled by foreigners and had been since Peter the Great, with foreigners’ owning most of the important industrial, banking, and transport enterprises. He said that aliens, in no way connected with the Russian people, developed the pure culture of the “genuine Russian” administrator.12

One can understand Trotsky’s psychological motivation for taking up this issue: He wanted to dissociate himself from the claim that Soviet Russia was ruled by aliens. He did not, however, emphasize the German nature of the foreign dominance, claiming that all European aristocracy had a supranational character, although all his examples are implicitly German. He spoke of the last tsarina as “this German woman,” “this Hessian princess” “with a Windsor upbringing” who used to say, “Russia loves to feel the whip.” Trotsky compared her to Marie Antoinette, the French empress (also of German birth) who was executed during the French Revolution. Both, said Trotsky, had a common denominator—gnawing hostility to an alien people under their rule.13

If Trotsky tried somehow to minimize German influence, the Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948) claimed in the 1920s that “the masculine German spirit had for a long time set Itself the task of civilizing the feminine Russian land … the German spirit acted in numerous sophisticated ways: through Marx, through Kant, through Steiner and through many other teachers who seduced us and weakened Russian will.” Berdiaev explained the “extraordinary power of Germanism in Russia” in religious-philosophical terms, but his main thesis was close to Trotsky’s.14

That thesis was exactly the central message of the novel Oblomov published by Ivan Gontcharov (1812-1891) in 1859. The main hero of the novel, a young landowner Ilia Oblomov, is a kind, feminine, passive personality plunged into daydreams and fruitless fantasies. His counterpart is his friend Andrei Stolz, a Russian German and the son of Oblomov’s family-estate supervisor. They were educated together and then their ways parted. Stolz quickly became an extremely dynamic and rich businessman while Oblomov gradually withdrew from any activity in order to live in foil seclusion and absolute idleness. A Russian girl Olga, who originally fell in love with Oblomov, later marries Stolz. It is quite possible that Berdiaev had in mind this classic juxtaposition of the masculine German spirit and the feminine Russian spirit, and later Oblomov became a classic literary image that was used by those Russians, including Lenin, who wanted to castigate Russian passivity and idleness.

A very recent interpretation of the foreign domination of Russia is that of an official Soviet ideologist, Fedor Nesterov, who claims that Russian autocracy was originally a reasonable and even a positive institution, serving specific Russian interests vis-4-vis Russian belligerence, but that it degenerated after Peter the Great because the ruling dynasty became foreign.15This “foreignization” of the rulers created the gap between the government and the people that eventually led to the revolution. Nesterov identifies the entire Petersburg period of Russian history with foreign influence.

Russian Nationalism

For a long time, Russia had a very strong nationalist and sometimes even xenophobic tradition. Like every nationalism, that of Russia was not an abstract creation arising out of a political vacuum but a reaction against an external threat Russia was always in a state of belligerence. The Tatar- Mongols, who invaded Russia in the thirteenth century, were not the only enemies; in that period, Russia repulsed the attack of the Teuton knights, not without Tatar help. Later, Boland became the principal danger to Russian national existence, nearly crushing it in the seventeenth century.

It is not by chance that Russia developed such a strong and assertive nationalism as a manifestation of its geopolitical isolation and lack of allies. Neither Is It entirely accidental that the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome emerged in medieval Russia. The first proponent of this theory was the monk Philopheus who wrote in the sixteenth century:

The Church of the Old Rome fell because of the infidelity of the Apollinarian heresy. The Second Rome—the Church of Constantinople—was hewn down by the axes of the sons of Hagar. And now this Third Rome of thy mighty kingdom—the holy catholic and apostolic Church—will illumine the whole universe like the sun. . . . Know and accept, О pious Tsar, that all the Christian kingdoms have come together into thine own, that two Romes have Alien, and that a third stands, while a fourth there shall not be; thy Christian kingdom shall fall to no other.

To understand this concept, one has to put it into the correct conceptual framework. Philopheus certainly did not mean either Rome or Moscow as world political capitals. For him, Rome was only the seat of the Orthodox faith, the Rome of the apostles, since Rome was the first Christian capital according to Christian tradition. For Phllopheus, Byzantium was not a medieval superpower but the holder of the faith that had been inherited from Rome, which had meanwhile become heretical. The collapse of the First Rome was not political, but spiritual—from the political point of view, Rome was flourishing at the time of Philopheus. The collapse of the Second Rome was also political, but this fall was regarded as a divine punishment for the corruption of the Orthodox faith by the Greeks.

It was easy enough for an Orthodox Russian monk to come to the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome. From the viewpoint of Greek Orthodoxy, the Catholic West was heretical. Byzantium had collapsed. Russia, which had maintained its national independence, inherited the Greek Orthodox faith and thereupon became it* only stronghold. Philopheus could not then think of Russia as the Third Rome in political terms, but only as an ecclesiastical, a spiritual concept. Rome, as in the time of the Apostles, could be politically humble.

However, there was a political implication in Philopheus’ claim, since the very idea of equating Rome, Constantinople, and Moscow could imply a “grand design,” especially in view of the fact that the new Rome was obliged to preach the only noncorrupted faith through out the world. Indeed, every idea that assigns an exclusive feature to the specific locality might have geopolitical implications. The Third Rome concept was an anticipation of future Russian centrality. Indeed, the idea of Russian centrality became more and more pronounced as a corollary of Russian expansion. Later, however, this primitive organic unity of the Russian mind was split

After the Great made a breakthrough in bringing Russia out of its obscurity and isolation and making it a great European power, but this very breakthrough created the basic duality of Russian life. On the one hand, Russia became much stronger and accelerated its expansion. On the other, it was never modernized to European standards. Since Peter’s time, the basic dilemma of Russia has been very dear: its Asiatic or semi-Asiatic foundation versus its modernized ruling class and its growing physical strength as a great power. This duality influenced Russian nationalism too. Instead of one coherent ideology, Russian nationalism has always been split into seemingly opposing trends.

One of these trends, called Slavophilism, was inclined to accept Russia’s existing reality vis-i-vis the West and regard Russia’s backwardness as normal. The opposing trend, called Westernism, was deeply frustrated by Russia’s backwardness and strove to make it equal to the West, not in order to ruin Russia but to make it stronger, to Increase its attraction and the Russian state’s power. Even such an extreme Westernizer as Petr Tchaadaev (1794-1856), who was regarded as a national nihilist, said, “I love my fatherland as IV ter the Great taught me to love it.” He did not regard as antipatriotic the opinion that pre-Petrine Russia was barbaric. According to Tchaadaev, “it proves that Russians excel men of other nations in taking unbiased views of themselves. . . . Peter showed that Russia’s mission was to effect a deliberate synthesis of the best elements in European civilization.’’17 This opinion was also shared by Vissarion Belinsky (1811-1848), the literary critic.

Despite the fact that Slavophilism was conservative and Westernism was radical, they had a common denominator: Both were different manifestations of Russian militant nationalism. The Czech Slavist, later the first Czechoslovakian president, Tomáš Masaryk (1850-1937), emphasized that the Westernizer “had just as strong an affection for Russia as the Slavophiles.”18

John Plamenatz tried to distinguish the two types of nationalism as Western and Eastern in his general theory of nationalism, with no special reference to Russian nationalism. According to Plamenatz:  

nationalism it a reaction of peoples who feel culturally at a disadvantage. Not any reaction that cornea of a acme of weakness or insecurity but a reaction when certain conditions hold. Where there are several peoples in close contact with one another and yet conscious of their separateness, and these peoples share the same ideals and the same conception of progress, and tome of them are, or feel themselves to be, less well placed than others to achieve these ideals and make progress, nationalism it apt to flourish.19

This was exactly the case of Russian nationalism. One can follow this excellent explication of Plamenatz: “Nationalism is confined to peoples who, despite their rivalries and the cultural differences between them, already belong to, or are being drawn Into, a family of nations which all aspire to make progress in roughly the same directions.”20

Now Plamenatz makes a distinction between Western and Eastern nationalisms. His definition of Western nationalism is not very persuasive, but this lack is not important for our purpose. Plamenatz does provide us with an excellent definition of Eastern nationalism:

the nationalism of peoples recently drawn into civilisation hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. This Is the nationalism of peoples who feel the need to transform themselves, and in so doing to raise themselves.21

He stresses that this nationalism is Imitative and at the same time hostile to the models it Imitates. It is exactly the nationalism of the Westemizers, which was later inherited by the Bolsheviks:

It has involved, in feet, two rejections, both of them ambivalent, refection of the alien intruder and dominator who Is nevertheless to be Imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity.12

This Eastern nationalism was essentially pro-Western since it strove to abolish the basic split in Russian society and strengthen Russia through the use of Western methods and the Western way of life.

However, Plamenatz’s classification seems to be insufficient for the Russian case. One can define Westernism as an Eastern nationalism, but there is no possible way in which Slavophilism can be defined as a Western type of nationalism. In fact. Slavophilism was a nationalism that elevated backwardness in a narcissistic way to the rank of universality. One cannot help referring here to Trotsky, who called Slavophilism the “messianism of backwardness.”21 There is something to his definition.

Up until now, we have looked at Russian nationalism in the general context of East-West relations. There were other phobias directed against several Western countries—for example, France, Poland, and so on—but the most powerful phobia was directed against Germany and the Germane, and this phobia had been manifested in even the eighteenth century in various way. One of the numerous clashes was the conflict between the Russian poet-scientist Mikhail Lomonosov (1711-1765) and his German colleagues who dominated the Russian Academy of Science. Another was the Russian political opposition to Ernst Biron (1690-1772), the powerful German favorite of Empress Anna (1693-1740). Anti-German feelings became a powerful stream in Russian nationalism, but care had to be exercised in the expression of these feelings so that political persecution from the ruling German dynasty would not be forthcoming.

Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism

When one examines both of the above trends in the framework of Russian-German relations, one can understand why Slavophiles, for example, were regarded as so dangerous by the ruling autocracy. Indeed, if one examines in depth the utterances of Russian Slavophiles, one can see that their anti-Westernism was first and foremost directed against the Germans. All the outstanding Slavophiles—Konstantin Aksakov (1817-1860), Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856), Yuri Samarin (1819-1876), and others—were militant Germanophobes so it is not surprising that the ruling dynasty was extremely suspicious of all of them. Indeed, they were discriminated against and sometimes persecuted. In the spring of 1848, Yuri Samarin, who had participated in an administrative inspection of the Baltic provinces, decided to rebel. He resorted to what is now called in Russia “Samizdat” and sent his “Letters from Riga” to circulate in manuscript form. He accrued the Baltic Germans of oppressing Russians: “The Baltic Germans did not submit to the Russian state, on the contrary, they separated themselves from all Russians. . . . What right does a handful of newcomers have to trample on other people, to call themselves a nation, while bowing their heads before another people [Germans] who have extended state protection to them? Does every little group have a right to assign to Itself the dignity of a nation?”24

The Russian authorities found these “Samizdat” letters to be a most dangerous challenge. Samarin was arrested in March 1849 and brought within two weeks before Tsar Nikolai I (1796-1855), who told him:

You sow the hatred of Germans against Russians. You made them quarrel. You would like to turn Germans into Russians by using force and pressure. You write that if we will not dominate them, and so on, Le., if the Germane will not become Russians, then the Russians will become Germans. You hinted directly at the government You are trying to say that since Peter the Great and up to my time, everything is surrounded by Germans since … we are Germans ourselves. You incited public opinion against the government: a new December 14 was being prepared. . . . Your book would lead to worse than December 14, since it tries to undermine confidence in the government and its links with the people by accusing the government of betrayal of Russian national interests in favor of Germans. You ought to be brought before the court.25

Samarin was frightened by die tsar’s tirade and repented. He was released, and the lesson was well learned by the Russian public.

When later, in 1878, Ivan Aksakov violently criticized Russian diplomats forthe so-called Berlin treaty after the victorious Russo-Turkish War, he was expelled from Moscow. We can draw the conclusion that, essentially, the Russian Slavophiles were an oppositional, anti-German nationalist party.

In its original form, Slavophilism was a purely Russian domestic affair. Its concern was Russia as such, and it had no international implications. In spite of its title, “Slavophilism,” it was in fact “Russophilism.” But there was another Slavophilism, and it became one of the most important factors influencing the geopolitical conflict between Russia and the German world. Its implication included the escalation of the Russian-German conflict in Russian-German revolutionary movements. It was Pan-Slavism. In spite of the evident lack of any Slavic unity and the lack of a common language, a common religious fifth, or a common historical tradition, ft was widely believed both by Pan-Slavists and by their adversaries that Slavs in their entirety formed a unique group that was striving for political unity. The contemporary and future destiny of the Slav nations has proved that Pan- Slavism was merely wishful thinking. However, ignorance and political romanticism made Pan-Slavism an important political obsession in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, one might go so for as to say that the chimera of Pan-Slavism has played a fatal role in world history. Not only did Pan-Slavism not sustain its credibility in Russian-Polish relations, ft did not do so in Russian-Czechoslovak relations or in Russia’s relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Even Ukrainian nationalism, which raised no suspicions in anyone, suddenly emerged as a very dynamic force.

At the time, Western Slavs were under the domination of various political entities, among them Austria and Turkey. In part because of their physical presence as a boundary between Russia and Germany, the Slavs acquired a strategic importance because of a growing European and especially German obsession with the Russian peril. But the Western Slavs were becoming discontented. Some of them were revolutionaries, and there were a few Slavic Russophilia who dreamed of a unified Slavic superstate under Russian domination. This romanticized Russophilia was not shared by the majority of the Slavs.

On the other hand, Pan-Slavism did not enjoy the good wishes of the Russian government for several important reasons. Pan-Slavism was a revolutionary movement, and any Slavic movement directed against Germane could have far-reaching domestic implications in Russia. As history has confirmed, the national momentum of Pan-Slavism posed a threat to the ruling Russian elite, which was of alien origin, and no wise tsar could support the movement unless he was prepared to make radical changes in the Russian political infrastructure. How could a tsar be expected to support a revolutionary pan-Slavism if it encouraged the bitter enemies of autocracy, the first Russian revolutionaries to arrive in the West—Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) and Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876)? It is important to stress that later Pan-Slavism also incorporated Slavophilism, which made the movement even more frightening for the non-Russian element in Russia’s ruling elite.

Westernism and Pan-Slavism

Alexander Herzen had an extremely strong Impact on the revolutionary movement, as was widely acknowledged in all areas of Russian political thought He was a most influential Russian political thinker and, as Isaiah Berlin claims, also the most interesting one.“ The Bolsheviks could not even acknowledge the full extent of their debt to Herzen, and Daniel Pasmanik (1869-1930), a former Zionist leader, could point out that the Bolsheviks were much closer to Herzen than to Marx,27 a very legitimate historical judgment Most recently, Fedor Nesterov referred to Herzen in approving his attacks against Russophobia.28

Ostensibly, Herzen was an enthusiastic Westernizer, but even before he left Russia in 1847 to settle in Paris, he was casting doubts on the Western revolutionary potential and preaching the decline of the West in its entirety.29 He concluded that the Slavophiles (his former friends) had a point It was high time, he thought, for Russia to raise its voice: He believed that only Russia could solve the problems that were allegedly devastating Europe. More important, Herzen suggested the principle of the independent character of Russian socialism, which must take advantage of Pan-Slavism. He regarded Russia as a young nation and, as such, healthier than the West. He protested against a Spanish contemporary, Marquis Donozo Cortez (1803-1853), who prophesied a barbaric Slavic invasion of Europe, which would ruin it, although the Slavs would then be poisoned by the European corpse.10 Herzen retorted: “Russia is an empire still in its youth, a building still fresh with the smell of plaster, where everything is experimental and in a state of transition, where nothing is final. . . . We are simpler, we are healthier, we are incapable of any sickbed fussiness over food, we are no lawyers, no bourgeois.”11

This concept had a very strong impact on the Bolsheviks, as did another of his suggestions: “Russia stands in the same position with regard to the Western world and to the proletariat She has received nothing but misfortune, slavery and shame.”12 Although this idea had been widely absorbed by the Bolsheviks by the eve of World War I, Herzen had already arrived at the existential rejection of the West and was preaching its decline in 1847. He said: “I don’t believe in anything except for a small group of people, a small number of thoughts. … I have no pity for anything that exists here, neither for its superficial education nor for its institutions.’133

Herzen anticipated the fetal Slavic thrust against a decaying Europe. He wrote that Russia’s future would pose a grave danger for Europe and that every day could see the overthrowing of Europe’s old social structures and the embroilment of Russia in an Immense and overwhelming revolution.14 Here we are approaching the central issue of Russian radicalism. Herzen was probably the first to anticipate that a Russian social revolution would immediately acquire a universal expansionist dimension, transforming Russia into the world center. This was not only wishful thinking. Russia was indeed the biggest country in the world, and this fact was always, wittingly or unwittingly, in the mind of any Russian thinker. As a citizen of such a large country, Herzen’s thought was naturally universal, supported as he was by the scale of his country. This point was well stressed by Berdiaev, who said that the patriotism of a great nation must necessarily be faith in its great and universal mission, otherwise it would be a provincial nationalism, limited and lacking in any universal perspective.35

Herzen could not be parochial. The Russian revolution must acquire a universal dimension, such as the international dimension the French Revolution had acquired as early as 1793. A great social revolution, linked to the idea of revolutionary expansion, was necessary. Herzen was confronted by Western socialists, which meant that the problem at stake for him from the very beginning was, Which revolution should be the leading one, the Western or the Russian? Western socialists regarded themselves as entitled to lead the universal socialist revolution since, in their view, socialism was the last achievement of Western civilization. But for Herzen, the West was rotten to the core. The Slavic world might be barbaric, but it was young, and the biological future belonged to it.

Herzen was not only a Pan-Slavist but also a Germanophobe. He followed his former friend, Yuri Samarin, but made his point even stronger. According to Herzen, since Peter the Great, Russia had been ruled by aliens and more specifically, by Germans. His book on Russian-German relations as the framework of the Pan-Slavist revolutionary expansion was published in French in 1853 and had wide repercussions, which have lasted until even now.36

Herzen’s book created a chain reaction of substitutions through which various Russian thinkers created mirror images of various Western ideas. Herzen, for example, substituted Western Russophobia with Russian Germanophobia. His appeal to destroy Germany by Slavic revolutionary invasion was a mirror image of a similar German concept since many radical Germans proposed the crushing of autocratic and reactionary Russia by a German revolutionary invasion.

This confrontation between Russian and German socialists became a hotbed of future European geopolitics, which permeated revolutionary thought in such a way that every revolutionary movement was a political inheritor of its country. Both sides justified their phobias, anticipating threats from each other. Western socialists regarded Russia as a barbaric horde while Herzen claimed that Russia was barbaric but young. Moreover, the German threat to Russia had to be taken into consideration, since Baltic and other Germans already dominated Russia.

The Germane were far from representing progress; with no links to the country which they made no effort to study and which they detested as barbaric, arrogant to the point of insolence, they were the most servile instruments of imperial authority. Having no objective but that of remaining in favor, they served the ruler, not the nation. Besides, they introduced manners uncongenial to Russians and a pedantic bureaucracy, etiquette, and discipline completely contrary to our customs.

The hostility between Slavs and Germane is a sad, but well-known, fact Each conflict between them reveals the depth of their hatred. German domination, by its nature, has contributed much to the spreading of this hatred to Western Slavs and Boles. The Russians never had to submit to their oppression. If Russian possessions on the Baltic coast were conquered by Knights of the Teutonic order, they were inhabited by Finnish, not Russian, populations. Although of all the Slavs the Russians were those who least hated the Germans, the natural repugnance which existed between them could not be erased.

They have the advantage of us in their definite, elaborated rules; they belong to the great European civilization. We have the advantage of them in our robust strength and a certain latitude of hopes. Where they are stopped by their conscience, we are stopped by a policeman. Arithmetically weak, we yield; their weakness is algebraic, it is within the formula itself

We deeply offend them by our carelessness, our conduct, our lack of attention to form, and by our display of semi-barbaric and semi-corrupted passions. They have mortally annoyed u by their bourgeois pedantry, their «fleeted purism, by their irreproachably petty behavior.37

Herzen called Nikolai I one of the most remarkable Russian Germans who wanted to be Russified.’’38 Escalating his attacks, Herzen said: “Russian Germans are the worse of all Germans who have political power. … A German from Germany in our government can be naive, even stupid, but he can be benevolent to barbarians whom he ought to humanize. A Russian German is clever to some extent and looks with contempt at the people, as if he is a relative who is ashamed of them.”39

According to Herzen, the Germans conquered Russia through violence and exposed the country to German ideas. Since the time of Peter the Great, the Germans had been training Russians in a way completely alien to the Slavic character.90

Germanized Russians are even worse than Germans, and if someone has fallen under German influence, it is extremely difficult to find a way out of this trap, as is manifested by all of the Petersburg period of Russian history. For Herzen, a most distasteful example of a Germanized Russian was the minister Alexei Araktcheev (1769-1834), who tried to militarize the life of the Russian peasants in the Prussian mode.41

Herzen dreamed of the greatness of Russia and even boasted of the fear that tsarist Russia inspired. He anticipated

Russian domination which reaches the Rhine, which goes down as far as the Bosphorus, and which on the other side extends to the Pacific . . . Germany exists only in name.42 

The emperor Nikolas, carrying out grand works, the sense of which escapes him, may, if he pleases, humiliate the sterile arrogance of France and the majestic prudence of England; he may declare the Ottoman Empire to be Russian and Germany, Muscovy.43 

There is only one thought that links the Petersburg to the Moscow period«—that of the expansion of the state. Everything was sacrificed fix the sake of this: the dignity of the sovereigns, the blood of the subjects. Justice toward their neighbors, the well-being of the entire country.44

Herzen appealed for the ending of the Petersburg period, saying that “if tsarism perishes, the center of liberty will be in the heart of the nation— in Moscow.”43Therefore, the Russian revolutionary movement was from its first steps nationalist and potentially expansionist.

It was through Herzen that the discovery of the Russian rural commune by August Haxthausen (1792-1866), a Prussian official who studied Russia) was absorbed by Slavophilism. On the other hand, Haxthausen’s discovery made Western socialists believe that the Russian autocracy might take advantage of Russian primitive rural communism in order to export revolutionary Pan-Slavism to the West and undermine European political stability. The idea that the Russian autocracy might export revolutionary Pan-Slavism against Germany and Europe spread rapidly in the West.46 

It was Herzen’s ideas that became the principal source for the growing fear of any Russian radical revolution in the West Russia was regarded as a barbaric Oriental society that needed to be civilized before any quest for international leadership could be launched. But this quest had already been launched by Herzen.

The very existence of Russian rural primitive communism only confirmed basic Russian backwardness in the eyes of Western socialists, and the very Idea of a Russian or Slav invasion, even under revolutionary slogans, was frightening to European socialists. Moses Hess (1812-1875) sent Herzen an indignant letter, accusing him of having no respect for historical laws. “As a Russian,” Hess said, “you countervail history with a certain hostility. As a philosopher you do not want to anticipate the future. As a Russian you forecast that the family of Slav nations will inherit the family of European nations as the latter have become too old to be revived. As a philosopher, the future contains for you an infinite number of options. However, as a Russian you anticipate only one possibility: namely, that of a Slavic invasion.” According to Hess, such an invasion could bring only a “reactionary socialism.” Hess also said that he could “by no means support the idea of a Slavic invasion. The death of European civilization does not contain any germ of life, any revival.”47

Herzen’s name became taboo for Western socialists. As a repercussion of his revolutionary Pan-Slavism, several books appeared in the West that forecast the export of revolution by the tsars themselves, though there were a few Hegelian voices according to which a Slavic invasion could be fruitful since it would be another manifestation of the spirit of history, bringing perfection to all humanity.

In the middle of the 1850s, the idea of Russia’s exporting revolution became a commonplace. A century later, a Polish refugee, Wladzimir Baczkowsky, published a book in which he warned against the Soviet drive for world domination. As a wise and unique prophecy he quoted Zygraunt Krasinsky (1812-1859), a Bole who had warned in 1854 that “Russia will give all her power to social revolution in order to overthrow the thrones of those dynasties which recently broke off their alliances with her or despised her.”48 In fact, Krasinsky had only repeated what was being said by many leading Europeans at that time, and the Russian revolutionary movement acquired a strong geopolitical context in its cradle. We will see later that the attitude to Herzen became a litmus paper of the extent of nationalism in the Russian revolutionary movement.

At the end of his life, Herzen tempered his militant Pan-Slavism to some extern. In a letter written in 1869 he did not repeat his Slavic grand design, but he did not repudiate it either. He did not abandon his early idea of European destruction, although he claimed that this destruction should be only the first stage of revolution, which would be followed by the creative one.49 This message was lost on the West, and Herzen entered European history as a rabid anti-German Pan-Slavist.

Marxism as German Revolutionary Nationalism

Although the Russian revolution was geopolitically conditioned to be nationalist and expansionist, the same might be said of the German revolutionary movement. First of all, Marxism, in spite of its declaratory internationalism, from the outset implied that the social struggle must be carried out within national boundaries and only alter a successful victory in a certain country should the proletariat fulfill its international obligations. One can find this claim in Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto published in 1848: “Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.”50 Of course, “national struggle” in this context meant only a tactical step. This point was confirmed again in the Manifesto:

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it Is so fin, itself national, though not in the bourgeois tense of the word.51

These ostensible tactics immediately implied some strategy since the problem of an international leadership between different world proletariat “detachments” emerges. But even if one ignores the relationship between different European working-class “detachments,” one can see that Marxism was Eurocentric, regarding Asia as inherently hostile, backward, and barbaric. Russia was the spearhead of Asiatic barbarism directed against European civilization. Marxism inherited the obsession with Russia from contemporary European political philosophy, and not only an obsession but a real Russophobia; Marxism was not only Eurocentric, it was Germanocentric. Marx and Engels firmly believed in the German cultural and political leadership of Germany and stressed this point in the Manifesto. This belief is why their attitude toward Russia became a focal point of the political thinking of Marx and Engels.

One must stress the basic duality of the Marx-Engels heritage. Milorad Drachkovitch was perfectly right when he distinguished between Marxist theoretical thought and Marxist current political analysis as expressed by Marx and Engels, not only as political journalists but also in their correspondence. As Drachkovitch noticed, Marx and Engels “revised and invalidated” their own theoretical teaching in this second and almost more important part of their activity.52

Marx and Engels singled out European historical development from all of human history. For example, they could not apply their historical materialism to stagnant, rigid Oriental systems like those of India, China, or Japan. This difficulty is why Marx suggested that world historical development is multilinear and that Oriental societies, with their so-called Asiatic mode of production (meaning they are neither feudal nor slaveholding but are baaed on a centralized bureaucracy) cannot develop into modern societies aa a result of their internal social dynamism.53 They need an external stimulus to break their mode of production and their ancient stagnation. With reference to India, Marx demonstrated that only English colonial rule had broken the Indian stagnation (at least, as he thought). He was certainly wrong about the rigidity of Japan’s system.

Neither India nor China had any emotional significance for Marx and Engels; these countries were too far from Europe. Russia, however, was Europe’s neighbor, although, according to Marx and Engels, it had the same Oriental despotism and a bureaucracy that tried to consolidate its control over dispersed and primitive rural communes. Although Russia had a superficially Europeanized government, deep down it was Asiatic, as almost all experts in Russian affairs then claimed. According to Marx and Engels, Russia’s expansionist drive had become a threat to European civilization, which could be frozen or could even regress as a result of Russia’s influence.

Umberto Melotti noted that

“Marx was led to conclude that there was no potential for autonomous development within societies based on the Asiatic mode of production. . . . Asiatic society was to receive the requisite stimulus from European colonialism.”4

Therefore, according to a fundamental and implicit view of Marx and Engels, Russia needed European colonialism.

Theoretically Marx and Engels explained Oriental societies in terms of their social structure, but in their political analysis they resorted to something that was very dose to racism. For all practical purposes, Marx and Engels were militant German nationalists with racist overtones, whose attitude to the Teuton-Slav confrontation was only ostensibly different from that of Prussian militarists.55 An Israeli historian, Jean Daniel, recognized that the

founders of Marxism did not try to distinguish between Russian rulers and the oppressed Russian people. They often identified tsarism with Russians and Russians with tsarism. From their point of view, Russia as a whole was regarded as a single concept: cumulative and negative. Both historical Russia and contemporary Russia were reflected in their minds and feelings as a materialization of evil. Probably their “rational” and irrational hatred of Russia was nourished by what was left in their souls and memories of old anti-Slav and anti-Russian prejudices and feelings of their German environment, the environment in which they were brought up.54

This accusation is almost impossible to dismiss. Soviet Marxists, beginning with David Riazanov (Goldendach, 1870-1938), tried to whitewash the Russophobia of Marx and Engels, claiming that the founders of Marxism hated only Russian autocracy.57 One should examine the numerous statements on Russia made by Marx and Engels to form his or her own judgment.

As early as 1842 Engels spoke of the Slavonic East as a barbarian land contained by civilized Germany:

It is now several years since Königsberg in Prussia acquired an importance which must be gratifying to all Germany. . . . The German element there has rallied its strength and claims to be recognized as German and respected as Germany’s representative vis-à-vis the barbarism of the Slavonic East. And, indeed, the East Prussians could not represent Germany’s culture and nationhood vis-à-vis the Slavs better than they have done.”

There la not the slightest doubt that Marx and Engels did not distinguish between the tsar and ordinary Russians. In 1844, Engels wrote that Nikolai I “is worshipped by the dumb, beastly stupidity of his degraded serfs.”” There was a strong escalation of racist attacks against the Russians as a whole in 1853-1855, during the Crimean War. Let me give a few examples. Marx wrote in July 1853:  

There Is a facetious story told of two Persian naturalists who were examining a bear; the one who had never seen such an animal before, Inquired whether that animal dropped its cubs alive or laid eggs; to which the other, who was better Informed, replied- “That animal Is capable of anything.” The Russian bear Is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing.60

In November 1853, he wrote:

“The external dream of Russia was at last realised. The barbarian from the icy banks of the Neva held in his grasp luxurious Byzantium, and the sunlit shores of the Bosphorus.’’61

In a month, Marx said:

There Is no such word In the Russian vocabulary as honor. . . 

For the invention of Russian honor the world is exclusively indebted to my Lord Palmerston, who, during a quarter of a century, used at every critical moment, to pledge himself, In the most emphatical manner, for the “honor” of the Czar. . . 

Now It happens that the noble lord while he expressed “his most implicit confidence In the honor and good faith” of the Czar, had just got Into possession of documents, concealed from the rest of the world and leaving no doubt. If any existed about the nature of Russian honor and good faith.

He had not even to scratch the Muscovite In order to find the Tatar. He had caught the Tatar in his naked hideousness.62

In the same month, December 1853, Marx wrote:

“Let us hope that the Russian Government and people may be taught … to restrain their ambition and arrogance, and mind their own business hereafter.”63

The founders of Marxism extended their distaste to all the Slavic race and saw the Slav-German conflict as racist in background For this reason, not only Russia but also Pan-Slavism was regarded by them as a mortal threat to Germany and to Europe. In April 1855, Engels said:

The Slav race, long divided by internal disputes, pushed back towards the East by the Germans, subjugated partly, by Germans, Turks and Hungarians, quietly reuniting its branches after 1815, by the gradual growth of Pan-Slavism, now for the first time asserts its unity and thus declares war to the death on the Roman-Celtic and German races, which have hitherto dominated Europe. Pan-Slavien I« not merely a movement for national independence, it U a movement that strives to undo what the history of a thousand years has created, which cannot attain its ends without sweeping Turkey, Hungary and half Germany off the map of Europe, a movement which—should it achieve this result—cannot ensure its future existence except by subjugating Europe. Pan-Slavism has now developed from a creed into a political program, with 800,000 bayonets at its service. It leaves Europe with only one alternative: subjugation by the Slavs, or the permanent destruction of the center of their offensive force—Russia.64

Man and Engels explained all German misfortunes in terms of Russian political pressure and appealed for a “holy war” against Russia. Speaking in London in 1867 at a meeting on solidarity with Poland, Man said: “In the first place the policy of Russia is changeless, according to the admission of its official historian, the Muscovite Karamsin. Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination— is a fixed star. In our times only a civilized government ruling over barbarian masses can hatch out such a plan and execute it.”65 Engels said in 1875 that Russia must be annihilated and dismantled, or at least must be contained in Asia.

Therefore, no revolution in western Europe can be definitely and finally victorious as long as the present Russian state exists at its side. Germany is its nearest neighbor. Germany must sustain the first shock from the armies of Russian reaction. The overthrow of the Russian tsarist state and the dissolution of the Russian empire is therefore one of the first conditions for the final victory of the German proletariat.66

Marx and Engels almost ignored the fact that Russia was essentially ruled by a non-Russian minority. The only rather strange concession to this situation was Engels’s controversial explanation that Russian foreign policy was the result of a conspiracy of foreign adventurers. According to Engels, this conspiracy had lasted more than a century.67 Engels, however, tried to conceal the German domination of this alleged conspiracy, giving first place on the list of these foreign adventurers to Carlo Pozzo di Borgo (1764— 1842), a Corsican rival of Napoleon.

Later it was suggested that Russia was only a scapegoat for Marx to justify why Germany did not behave according to his theoretical laws.68 One cannot entirely dismiss this allegation, but it seems that the German nationalism of Marx and Engels had deeper roots, especially in view of the fact that their nationalism served as a pattern for all Marxist-Inspired revolutionary movements.

In fact, Marxism, as did socialism, implied populism determined by the Marxist “electorate.” Being self-appointed “proletarian” leaders, Marx and Engels felt that they were under “populist” influence. Certainly, the German proletariat had social concerns, but the national concern was much stronger, in spite of Marxist theory.

Marx and Engels had to rely on the value system of their “electorate” to have any influence on its members. Among German workers, nationalism was a harsh reality; for this reason, declaratory Internationalism, along with a very nationalist realpolitik, very soon became the approach of Marx and Engels, and it was the source of the basic duality between Marxist theoretical thought and its practical policy.

If one attempts to be a successful politician while relying on a nonrealistic ideology, one has to absorb something that is alien to one’s declaratory ideology. That is why socialism and nationalism are closely linked to each other. The “worker” is not only a social being, as Marx and Engels theoretically suggested, he or she is also (and perhaps first and foremost) a national being. German and Russian history have proved this point dramatically, and it has been repeated by every successful socialist movement: To be successful, the movement has to be nationalized.

It is interesting how, for example, Bolshevik leaders were forced to the realization that what they called “workers” according to Marxist theory were in fact Russian peasants with all their typical traits. In order to vindicate their theory and to justify their own legitimacy as holders of the proletarian dictatorship, the Bolshevik leaders introduced various Internal distinctions within the working class, such as the notion of a “lower strata” of the working class, Le., new workers who had only recently arrived from rural areas.

Trotsky, for example, said that the working class was recruited from peasants as if this idea were an enormous theoretical discovery, even though every working class is recruited from this source. Trotsky had to stress this fact in order to point out the alleged negative characteristics of Russian peasants—their lack of individuality, their passivity—that were inherited by new workers.69

One must take into consideration the fact that the Bolsheviks also introduced the notion of a “working aristocracy,” which, according to them, did not constitute an authentic part of the working class. The principal accusation against the working aristocracy was their chauvinism, as we will see. Therefore, one can ask, what is the genuine working class? What is the optimal span of work experience that will make a worker a genuine part of such a class, neither retarded nor corrupted?

The extent of Marx and Engels’s nationalism was not conditioned only by the specific traits of their doctrine. German nationalism, which was shared by them, was the most assertive of the European nationalisms, and it had racist overtones.

Russian Revolutionary Nationalism Versus German Revolutionary Nationalism

Now the love-hate relationship between Russian and German socialists can be understood. Russian socialists, from Herzen to Lenin, were magnetically attracted by the extraordinary intellectual power and outstanding erudition of Marx and Engels. At the same time, the former came up against the latter’s extreme arrogance and disdain of all that emanated from Russia. Russian socialists of every ilk, with few exceptions, recognized the intellectual superiority of Marx and Engels, though they quarreled about the Implementation of their ideas with respect to Russia. With that exception, Russian socialists inside Russia knew only the theoretical aspects of Marxism; they had as a rule little idea of practical Marxism, and when they finally came across it, it was too late for them. They had to reconcile themselves to this basic duality of Marxism, although an explosion might happen sooner or later.

When Herzen advanced the idea of a Pan-Slavic revolutionary invasion of Europe and the destruction of European civilization, Marx and Engels were furious. On February 13, 1855, Marx wrote to Engels: “at no time and in no place do I wish to appear alongside Herzen, not being of the view that Old Europe should be rejuvenated with Russian blood.”70  They realized that Russia must be rejected en bloc, both autocratic and revolutionary ‘Russia, since the very scale of Russia, its very size, inspired Russian socialists to be overambitious. Marx and Engels maintained a deep hatred for Herzen all their lives, refusing to regard him as a revolutionary. They called him a Pan-Slavist and a landlord, which was basically true although not the entire truth. Marx even managed to immortalize his distaste of Herzen in a footnote of Das Kapital:

Since on the European continent the influence of capitalistic production, which has undermined the human race … Is developing further, hand in hand with competition in the size of national armies, state debts, taxes, the elegant conduct of war, etc., the rejuvenation of Europe by means of the knout and the forced infusion of Kalmyck blood, may finally become unavoidable, a rejuvenation so earnestly prophesied by the half-Russian and entirely Muscovite Herzen. (This scribbler, it should be noted in pasting, made his discoveries concerning “Russian communism” not in Russia, but in the works of the Prussian State Counsellor, Haxthausen).71

Nothing could change this negative attitude. Engels would say in 1894:

The opinions concerning the Russian communistic village communities which he raised against me were in essence those of Herzen. This Panslavist journalist parading as a ” revolutionary” had learned from Haxthausen’s Russian Studies that the unfree peasants on his estate do not know private property in land, but rather re-divide fields and pastures among themselves from time to time. As a Journalist he did not need to learn what soon afterwards became common knowledge, that communal ownership of land is a form of property which was predominant in pre-historic times among the Germans, Celts, Indians— in short among all Indo-Germanic peoples—still exists in India, has only recently been forcibly suppressed in Ireland and Scotland, and occurs even here and there in Germany but is now dying out. In fact, it is an institution common to all peoples at a certain state of development.

But since he was a Plsnslavist who could only be called a socialist by name he found in this fact a new pretext to present his “holy” Russia and its mission—to rejuvenate and to fertilize again the rotten degenerate West, by force if necessary—in a still more splendid light when contrasted with this same decadent West72

Neither Marx nor Engels ever met Herzen, so their relations were static. Meanwhile, there was a real personal (one might even say titanic) drama between Marx and Engels on the one side and Herzen’s friend, Mikhail Bakunin, the founding father of anarchism, on the other. The two sides knew each other well and tried several times to cooperate, which led only to disastrous consequences. The struggle started when Bakunin appealed to German Slavs in 1848 to destroy the Austrian empire. He called German Slavs, “German slaves.”73 At the same time, Bakunin urged Western Slavs not to submit to the oppressive Russian autocracy. This plea was, and could only be, like a red rag to Marx and Engels. They suspected that Bakunin was a Russian agent provocateur, and the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, a newspaper edited by Marx and Engels, published a letter alleging that Bakunin worked for the tsarist government, referring to information allegedly received from George Sand (1804-1876), the French writer. George Sand published an indignant disclaimer, and later Marx and Engels always claimed that their allegation had been the result of a misunderstanding—Bakunin was never a provocateur.74

However, they claimed there was a certain ambivalence in his political behavior. Arrested in the West and imprisoned in Russia after 1848, Bakunin wrote a voluntary confession to Tsar Nikolai I, which is very genuine and credible.

I assured myself that Russia—in order to save her honor and her future- must carry out a revolution, overthrow your Tsarist authority, destroy monarchical rule, and, having thus liberated herself from internal slavery, take her place at the head of the Slav movement Then she must turn her arms against the Emperor of Austria, against the Prussian King, against the Turkish Sultan, and also, If necessary, against both Germany and the Magyars—In a word, against the whole world—for the final liberation of all Slav nations from an alien yoke. Half of Prussian Silesia, the great part of West and of East Prussia—in a word, all Slavic-speaking, Polish-speaking lands—had to be detached from Germany. My fantasies went even further. 1 thought, I hoped that the Magyar nation (forced by circumstances, by its isolated position in the midst of Slav peoples, and also by its more Eastern than Western nature), that all the Moldavians and the Vlachs, and finally even Greece would enter the Slav union; and thus there would be created a single, free, Eastern state, a reborn Eastern world, as it were, in contrast to the Western, although not hostile to the latter, and that its capital would be Constantinople. . .

I am now still convinced that if you, Sire, had wished at that time to raise the Slav banner, then they unconditionally, without discussion, blindly submitting to your will, they and all others who speak Slavic in the Austrian and Prussian possessions would have thrown themselves with joy and fanaticism under the broad wings of the Russian eagle and would have rushed with fury not only against the hated Germans but against all Western Europe as well.

A strange thought was then born within me. I suddenly took it into my head to write to you, Sire, and was on the point of starting the letter. . .

I Implored you, Sire, in the name of all oppressed Slavs, to come to their aid, to take them under your mighty protection, to be their savior, their father, and, having proclaimed yourself Tsar of all the Slavs, finally to raise the Slav banner in eastern Europe to the terror of the Germans and all other oppressors and enemies of the Slav race!74

Bakunin did not publish his letter to the tsar in 1848. Marx and Engels never knew about his confusion; otherwise they would have justified their reservations against Bakunin by pointing out his own ambivalence.

While Bakunin was in prison in Russia, Marx’s adherents spread rumors to the effect that he was not imprisoned at all but was serving in the Russian army in the Caucasus. This rumor was not true, but when Bakunin was in (a very easy going) exile in Siberia, he became an uncritical admirer of the Siberian governor, Nikolai Muraviev-Amursky (1809-1881), who at that time systematically expanded Russian territories in the Far East, sometime« without any direct government approval. Bakunin sent Herzen one letter after another filled with enthusiastic praise of Muraviev-Amursky’s patriotic activity.16

One must therefore acknowledge that Bakunin was too controversial, and he had also become a rabid Germanophobe. In the above-quoted confession, he wrote to the tsar

the Germans suddenly had become loathsome to me, so loathsome that I could not speak with one of them with equanimity, could not bear to hear the German language or a German voice, and I remember that once when a little German beggar boy walked up to me to ask for alms, I could hardly refrain from giving him a thrashing.77

The conflict between Marx and Engels on the one hand and Bakunin on the other is very often interpreted as the ideological confrontation between anarchism and Marxism, but it was only a rationalization of a greater conflict between German and Russian socialism, which were incompatible from a geopolitical viewpoint Herzen started this conflict; Bakunin only followed him.

Neither Herzen nor Bakunin contested the intellectual superiority of Marx. On the contrary, Bakunin several times stressed his admiration for Marx as an intellectual.78 Marx evidently regarded his conflict with Bakunin as national, violently rejecting the very idea of any special Russian revolutionary mission. Marx regarded Bakunin as his most serious contender and accused him of being an ambitious potential dictator of international socialism.

Bakunin did nothing to allay this suspicion. In 1870, for example, he proposed mobilizing 40,000 young Russians who had no permanent employment in Russia for revolutionary activity in Europe. Engels’s comment on this proposal was that if anything could ruin the European revolutionary movement, it would be 40,000 Russian “nihilists.”79

For some reason, Marx and Engels invited Bakunin to join their socialist International in 1868, when he was already an anarchist. This temporary alliance was short-lived, and Marx succeeded in ousting Bakunin from the group. In his struggle against Bakunin, Marx resorted to a political maneuver that anticipated the Bolshevik manipulation of the Communist International: He was asked by his Russian puppets to be “ the Russian representative” in the International.80

Bakunin then accused the German socialists of virulent nationalism.81 According to him, they took advantage of their socialist cover in order to gain ideological legitimacy for the German Drang nach Osten. He contested the Russophobia of Marx and Engels. According to Bakunin, Russia was ruled by a “mongolized German prince,” or by “a Germanized Genghis Khan.”82 He was highly critical of German workers,8’ although in his public statements he never resorted to a Germanophobia that was parallel or comparable to the Russophobia of Marx and Engels. However, as one can see from his confession, his reel anti-German feelings were as strong as, or stronger than, the anti-Russian feelings of Marx and Engels.

Bakunin claimed publicly that the nature of the German nation is more inclined to slow reforms than to a revolution. According to him, “German workers are the natural and violent enemies of a union with Russia and the Russian people. . . . Russian revolutionaries should not be surprised, and should not even be tony, if at some time German workers will extend their deep and legitimate hatred against everything inspired by the very existence of the Russian empire and all her political actions.”84

Bakunin accused Marx of inciting German workers to hate Russia. “Don’t they [the workers],” he asked, “too often following the example and advice of their leaders, mix the Russian empire and the Russian people in the same feeling of distaste and hatred?” “Indeed, what evil has the Russian empire inflicted on them?” “Has any Russian tsar dreamed of conquering Germany? Did he mire any German province?”84 German patriots therefore had no moral right to reproach the Russian empire. He dismissed the arguments of Marx and Engels that Russia exercised a morbid influence on Germany.86

Bakunin said that it would be much better if a genuine German patriot like Marx would use his historical erudition to prove that Germany itself was responsible for its contemporary political slavery. Meanwhile, according to Bakunin, Marx was trying to soothe German national vanity by ascribing Germany’s mistakes, crimes, and blots to a foreign influence.87

It was Germany, not Russia, according to Bakunin, that was trying to conquer its neighbors slowly and systematically and was always ready to extend its own political slavery to neighboring nations. It was Germany, not Russia, that was an international threat.88 Slavs had only one way out. If Herzen appealed for a Slavic invasion of Europe and for the destruction of European civilization, Bakunin suggested the concept of the international revolution, which would ruin all existing states, including Germany and Russia, in order to prevent German expansion into Russia.

According to Bakunin, only a universal community of free stateless nations could solve this geopolitical conflict. Slavs had to have their vested national interests to start such a revolution, which would have national-liberation implications.89 One can see that Bakunin’s anarchism had a deep national background. It was not only the rejection of an oppressive state but also the rejection of a state as an instrument of foreign oppression.

Is it not clear, therefore, that the Slavs must not seek and cannot conquer their rights and their place In history and In the brotherly alliance of peoples but by means of the social revolution?

But the social revolution cannot be the work of only one people; by its very nature, this revolution is international, which means that the Slavs, who aspire to their liberty, must for the sake of It link their aspirations and the organization of their national forces with the aspirations and organization of national forces of all the other countries.90

Bakunin was ready to send all Slavs to hell if they forged new chains for humanity.91 Contrary to Herzen, Bakunin warned pathetically against any advance inside Germany:

Let us compare your poverty and Impotence with German riches and power since . . . today Germany has become an arsenal bristling with menacing arms. And you, trained and armed so badly, would like to defeat it!

From the first step you would take on German soil, you suffer a crushing defeat and your offensive war would be transformed inthe field into a defensive war,the German army would invade the territory of the Russian empire.92

Bakunin was opposed to the so-called working aristocracy, since according to him, well-to-do workers are not revolutionaries. Only lumpen and peasants are genuine revolutionary material, and brigands are also an extremely important revolutionary force. As did Herzen, Bakunin anticipated the total destruction of the old society as a result of the revolution. Another extremely important point was anticipated by Bakunin. In defending his idea of a destructive peasant-lumpen-brigand revolution, Bakunin forecast that German socialists would decisively contest such a revolution on national premises:

Marxists . . . etatists under it all, they are forcibly brought to condemn every popular revolution, above all the peasant revolution, anarchic in nature and leading directly to the abolition of the state. Avid and Insatiable pan-Germanists, they are obliged to repudiate the peasant revolution, even if only that It Is essentially Slav.91

Bakunin was also fundamentally anti-Semitic. He introduced a strong anti-Semitic trend into Russian socialism and accused Marx of manifesting Jewish traits.94 He did not pay attention to the fact that all socialist Jews who confronted him were converted and anti-Semitic themselves. As a matter of fact, Jews who tried to be leaders of a socialist movement in a country that was inherently highly nationalistic had to be more nationalist than their “electorate.” They had to be the champions of a national cause in order to not make themselves vulnerable. This point was dramatically manifested during the Bolshevik revolution when many Jewish Bolsheviks championed Russian revolutionary nationalism to the point of being anti- Semitic themselves.

A Jewish historian, Judd Teller, had a very deep insight into what he called the Marx-Bakunin debates. One cannot help but quote his remarkable comments:

This racist debate between the Marxists and Bakunin was only a dress rehearsal for a horrible contest between the Germans and Russians. This contest has twice been fought to a draw on the stage of a global theater of war and seems scheduled for additional billing. The Russian anarchist and the German Socialist dialecticians undoubtedly knew their own people, and we may assume that each imputed to the other what he found reprehensible in his own race. Bakunin’s indictment of the Germans, therefore, may be in reality a portrait of Russia, and the Mam-Engela’ indictment of Russia may be a portrait of Germany. Place these portrait* alongside each other and they are, except for minor ornamental detail*, remarkably identical. Both peoples, somehow, have been clumsy with their liberties and succumbed to strong masters. Both countries have demonstrated a “barbarous” “energy and vigor,” have retreated only when handled in “the fearless way,” and have been unconscionable with neighbors, except that Russia has been more successful than Germany in holding down her subjugated peoples.91

One can stress once again that this Marx-Engels/Herzen-Bakunin confrontation was only an anticipation of the later clash between German and Russian socialists. It is also important to add that Mane and Engels not only clashed with Russian socialists, they also had a dramatic struggle with French socialists—primarily with Pierre Proudhon (1809-1865) and his followers. Marx and Engels did their best to discredit him, and Marx did not hesitate to write to Engels during the Franco-Prussian War that one of the positive results of a French defeat would be the defeat of the Proudhonists in their quest for leadership of the European revolutionary movement.96

We will see later that Lenin wittingly used Bakunin’s geopolitical arguments. Lenin was certainly against Bakunin’s anarchism in principle, but a major part of Bakunin’s political philosophy has no relation to anarchism whatsoever.

Pan-Slavism Receives Official Support in Russia

Only after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War did Pan-Slavism receive the first tacit support of the Russian government, a result of Russian isolation in Europe. Professor Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), the chief Russian Pan-Slavist of the time, could in 1855-1856 persuade the Russian government that the Slavs were Russia’s only reliable allies in Europe.97 That was wishful thinking, and it cost Russia a great deal.

Pan-Slavism was never accepted in prerevolutionary Russia as an official foreign policy, though it became a very powerful political tool of Russian nationalists who challenged German political domination in the Russian empire and eventually involved Russia in World War I. Pan-Slavists were extremely hostile to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, but sometimes friendly to France, England, and the United States due to simple geopolitical considerations. The specter of Pan-Slavism shadowed the European political scene and contributed to the escalation of mutual obsession and hostility.

The most important Pan-Slavist theoretician in Russia was a former Russian revolutionary, Nikolai Danilevsky (1822-1885).96 He was arrested, later repented, and became a prominent Russian biologist Danilevsky published in 1869 an extremely important book, Russia and Europe, which was another mirror image of the European obsession with Russia as a peril. He had a serious impact on his time, but he had a much stronger impact on poet revolutionary thought. A Menshevist historian, Boris Nikolaevsky (1887-1966), called Danilevsky die first Russian geopolitician,99 which is only partly correct since Bakunin and Herzen were geopoliticians too.

Danilevsky was influenced by a German philosopher, Heinrich Rückert (1823-1875), and claimed that humanity consists of ten cultural-historical types: (1) Egyptian, (2) Chinese, (3) Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician-Chaldean, (4) Indian, (5) Iranian, (6) Jewish, (7) Greek, (8) Roman, (9) neo-Semitic or Arab, and (10) German-Roman or European. These types are similar to biological entitles in that they have their birth, blossom, andthe. They struggle against each other, and the struggle is that of life and death. Every type develops its own laws and way of life, which cannot be imitated by another type.

According to Danilevsky, not all of humanity is covered by these types. Only peoples who have developed a cultural-historical type are positive actors in human history; other peoples are only comets among planets, and sometimes they are even “negative actors” in history (divine punishments). There are also tribes that acquire neither creative nor negative historical importance. They are only history’s “ethnographic material.” Human achievements are not cumulative and do not belong to the common historical stream, which is multilinear. There is no such thing, Danilevsky said, as a civilization shared by all of humanity, although it is not excluded that tome formal achievements of one civilization might be added to another.

Danilevsky’s philosophy of history had an extremely important political foundation. Its raison d’etre was the claim that the contemporary Slav civilization had to be transformed into a separate (the eleventh) cultural- historical type, as Slavs had nothing to do with the European cultural- historical type. Russia was not Europe. Europe was hostile to Russia as a well-established cultural-historical type faced with a potential rival. The Slavs were in a state of self-creation, and if they did not elaborate their cultural-historical type, they would be doomed to be ethnographic material for others.100(By the way, the notion of “ethnographic material” is dangerously dose to the Marxist notion of “nonhistorical” nations, an early Marxist example being the Czechs.)101

“The Slav idea,” said Danilevsky, “ought to be the highest idea for each Slav, preceded only by God and His holy church, above liberty, above science, above education, above any earthly blessings.”102 According to him, the dominant feature of European civilization was violence, which was completely alien to Slavs.103Russia, he added, was not a self-seeking country, and the driving force of the Russians was “internal moral consciousness.’’103

Meanwhile, Danilevsky completely excluded morality as a principle of international relations, in the same way as Machiavelli, although the former regarded himself as a faithful Orthodox Christian. In fact, Danilevsky’s theory was a mirror image of Pan-Germanism, which he regarded as a serious threat to Russia.

One can stress again that Pan-Slavism was a dynamic force in Russia, but it never gained the upper hand in Russian foreign policy. The only high-ranking Pan-Slavist diplomat was the Russian ambassador in Turkey in 1867-1877, Nikolai Ignatiev (1832-1908), who regarded Austrian and Ottoman Slavs as natural Russian allies in the struggle against Germany.109 Later he became minister of Internal affairs.

Russian Populism: The Worship of the Russian People

Herzen and Bakunin were only the first Russian socialist troublemakers for the Marxists. The next ones were Russian populists.106 Populism proceeded from the same source of Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, and like the Slavophiles, the populists worshiped the Russian people and differed only in their search for the latter’s liberation. In their idealization of the Russian people, the populists absorbed Herzen’s idea of the Russian rural commune, the obshchina, as primitive Slav communism and a means of bypassing capitalism. Contrary to Herzen and Bakunin, however, Russian populists were internally oriented and did not long for Russian revolutionary expansion. Some of them practiced political terror. Isaiah Berlin suggested that Russian populists “did not believe in the unique character or destiny of the Russian people. They were not mystical nationalists.”107 In fact, they were, because of their worship of their own people.

There has been immense discussion of Marx and Engels’s attitude toward Russian populism.106 In fact, the Marxist attitude to populism must also be put into the framework of Marxist geopolitics. Marx and Engels looked favorably at the Russian populists’ obsession with the obshchina for two evident reasons. First, Russian rural primitive communism was for Marx and Engels, not a manifestation of the precapitalist mode of production, but a manifestation of the Asiatic mode of production. This view excluded Russia completely from European civilization. For Marx and Engels, Russian primitive communism was incompatible with any Russian ambition for revolutionary leadership in Europe, since Russia was essentially backward. For this reason, they probably regarded Russian populism as an isolationist doctrine. Second, the populists also provided Marx and Engels with the future possibility of extending their benevolent patronage to a victorious Russian revolution, and even made them change their former negative attitude in 1878 to a positive one toward a premature Russian revolution.

Marx even suggested that Russian primitive communism might help Russia bypass capitalism in the case of a European social revolution:

The crucial question now is: can the Russian obshchina … an already seriously undermined form of the age-old communal property of the soil, become transformed directly into the superior form of communist ownership of land, or will it have to pass through the same process of decomposition which is evidenced by the course of the historical evolution of the West?

Today only one answer is possible to this question. If the Russian revolution sounds the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, [the decomposition of the communal ownership of land in Russia can be evaded] so that each complements the other, the prevailing form of communal ownership of land in Russia may form a starting-point for a communist course of development109 

Marx was essentially suggesting what later became known, linked to the name of Trotsky, as the theory of the permanent revolution. Russia should start a revolution— which was certainly not conceived by Marx and Engels as a proletarian one—and that revolution would spark off the European revolution. Then the generous and progressive European (German) proletariat would extend its support to backward Russia to help it construct a new society. Russia itself was not regarded as mature enough for such an endeavor. This theory was the mirror image of the Bakuninist theory of an international revolution. For Bakunin, however, the international revolution would save Russia from the German peril; for Marx and Engels, the international revolution would save Germany from the Russian peril.

In spite of some hesitations, Engels kept his favorable attitude to Russian primitive communism until his death, but on certain conditions:

From this it already follows that the initiative for such a possible transformation of the Russian village community can only originate, not in the community itself but solely among the industrial proletariat of the West. The victory of the Western European proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and the associated replacement of capitalistic production by one socially directed—that is the necessary precondition for raising the Russian village community to the same level.110

The favorites of Marx and Engels among the Russian populists were certainly Nikolai Tchernyshevsky (1828-1889) and to some extent Petr Lavrov (1823-1900). Tchernyshevsky never left Russia; Lavrov emigrated to the West in 1870, but neither he nor Tchernyshevsky contested the authority of Marx and Engels. They lacked concern for international affairs and, as Marx and Engels thought, did not dream of any Russian universal mission.

It seems, however, that the favorable attitude of Marx and Engels toward the populists was a result of insufficient information. Although the Russian populists were ostensibly isolationists, the internal dynamics of a victorious Russian populism could easily have led to the idea of a world revolutionary mission. Tibor Szamuely, for example, quotes Tchernyshevsky on Peter the Great: “For us, the ideal patriot is Peter the Great; we find our highest ideal of patriotism expressed in the passionate boundless devotion to the good of the country which inspired the life and animated the actions of this great man. … A Russian who possesses both mind and heart can never become anything other than a patriot in the mold of Peter the Great.”111 If one remembers that Peter the Great was Marx’s and Engels’s bête noire, and if one remembers that he was an expansionist par excellence, one can easily understand what kind of implications these factors could have for his revolutionary admirers.

There were also populists like Sergei Stepniak-Kravtchinaky (1851-1895) who appealed to change socialism’s German and foreign dress for the popular blouse of a Russian peasant.112 Many populists later repented and became monarchists and nationalists. Such was the destiny of a leading populist, Lev Tikhomirov (1852-1923), who signed the death warrant of Tsar Alexander II (1818-1881),  who was indeed assassinated by populists, but in later years Tikhomirov repented and became a right-wing nationalist. On the other hand, in 1883 a group of former populists led by Georgy Plekhanov (1856- 1918) organized the first Russian Marxist group proper, the Emancipation of Labor. However, the mainstream of Russian populism was later transformed into the so-called Social Revolutionary (SR) party, the left wing of which was later integrated into Bolshevism in 1917 and exercised very considerable Influence over the future Soviet system. A Soviet author called the SR party “neopopulist.”lu

Ferdinand Lassalle and His Etatist-Nationalist Influence on Russia

The real founder of German political socialism was neither Marx nor Engels, but Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864).114 If Marx and Engels were German nationalists, Lassalle was a German nationalist par excellence. His socialism was not only German but Prussian, in spite of the fact that he was a Jew, though anti-Semitic. He founded a social-democratic party in Prussia before Bismarck accomplished the unification of Germany, and he organized a strictly centralized party under his absolute personal leadership, which anticipated Lenin’s organizational ideas. Lassalle was an admirer of the etatist socialism that was deeply rooted in Prussian tradition and rejected any political cooperation with liberals, even tactical. He preferred a tacit cooperation with Bismarck while Marx and Engels were ready to cooperate tacitly with the liberals.

Lassalle regarded war with Russia as inevitable and necessary. In his view, Slavs were suitable only for colonization. He suggested the destruction of Turkey and the conquering of Turkish territories by the Germans. He also suggested the Anschluss of the Austrian empire.

Lassalle had an enormous Impact on Russian socialism. His immense popularity was to a certain extent due to a novel by Friedrich Spielhagen (1829-1911), whose hero was a romanticized Lassalle.119 The novel was quickly translated into Russian and had extraordinary success.

Lassalle’s books and pamphlets became part and parcel of every socialist library in Russia. He became the main channel through which socialist ideas, including Marxism, penetrated Russia at that time. As early as 1869, Herzen singled Lassalle out as a positive example of his defimse of the state versus Bakunin’s anarchism.116

A Soviet historian, David Zaslavsky (1880-1965), a former right-wing Jewish socialist who later became a pillar of the Soviet media under Stalin, tried to limit Lassalle’s influence in Russia to his etatism (which is in itself important enough).117 Zaslavsky also acknowledged Lassalle’s contribution to Russian revolutionary fervor. Indeed, a well-known Russian populist, Vladimir Debogorii-Mokrievitch (1848-1926), reported that Lassalle was used by the populists via a kind of substitution: everything Lassalle said about workers was interpreted by the populists as said about peasants.118 Zaslavsky acknowledged Lassalle’s influence on the programs of early Marxist circles, particularly in Plekhanov’s group, the Emancipation of Labor.119 A prominent Russian Bolshevik, Ivan Skvortsov-Stepanov (1870-1928), who was later to become editor in chief of lzvestia, also acknowledged that revolutionary thought in the 1890s was a mixture of Marx and Lassalle.120

The Menshevik leaders Pavel Axelrod (1850-1928) and Yuli Martov (Taederbaum, 1873-1923) were virtually intoxicated by Lassalle,111 and a prominent Soviet diplomat, the Soviet ambassador to England and deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs, Ivan Maisky (1884-1975), who moved from Menshevism to Bolshevism, reports that after reading Spielhagen’s book, Lassalle became his life modeL122 One can find an abundance of favorable references to Lassalle in the writings of leading Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. In fact, the extent of Lassalle’s popularity in Russia can be seen from the memoirs of a Georgian Bolshevik who described how demonstrators carried portraits of Lassalle, Marx, and Engels in the famous demonstration in Tiflis on April 22, 1901—a demonstration in which young Stalin participated. The portraits are mentioned in that order.121

Alexander Parvus (Helphand, 1869-1924) was another channel of Lassalle’s influence among Bolsheviks. Parvus was a Russian-Jewish socialist who emigrated from Russia to Germany at an early age. He admired Lassalle and wrote in 1904 that the proletariat should follow Lassalle’s precepts and penetrate the state. Parvus was an extremely important guide for Russian Bolshevism, although merely as a popularizer of political Marxism and Lassallianlsm among Bolsheviks. It is known that he exercised a strong influence over Trotsky and hypnotized him with the theory of permanent revolution, which Parvus had taken ready-made from Marx and Engels.124

Admiration for Lassalle permeated the Bolshevik revolution, and he became a prominent name on the Soviet list of the founding fathers of socialism, after Marx and Engels. His popularity lasted throughout the 1920s, and almost every Soviet town and city had its own Lassalle Street. He was recommended as standard reading in 1919 for Russian communists in a book by Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938) and Evgeny Preobrazhensky (1886- 1937), The ABC of Communism. At the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924 Lassalle’s portrait followed those of Marx and Engels.125

There is also interesting evidence of Lassalle’s Impact on Stalinists. Alexander Gorkin (b. 1897), who was chairman of the Tver’ provincial Soviet executive committee during the revolution and later became a favorite of Stalin and secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, published an article in 1919 calling Lassalle the “great teacher of the working movement” who, as Gorkin stressed, developed the theory of the basic foundations of the Soviet state.126 It is important to add that it was Gorkin who brought into political life the future main Soviet ideologist under Stalin, Andrei Zhdanov (1896-1946), who worked under Gorkin in the same Tver’ Soviet during the Civil War. Therefore, contrary to Zaslavsky’s opinion, Lassalle’s influence extended even into Stalin’s time.

Many opponents of the Soviet system among German socialists and communists claimed that the legacy of Lassalle’s etatism was Bolshevism,127 and Lassalle’s Influence did encourage another Russian mirror image of a German political idea. His German etatism and nationalism was changed by them to Russian etatism and nationalism.

Petr Tkatchev: The Revolutionary Reeducation of a Degraded People

The main official Soviet historian after the revolution, Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868-1932), called Petr Tkatchev (1844-1886) a Bolshevik,M and an Italian historian, Franco Venturi, noticed that Tkatchev found in Marxism the full expression of all his economic and historical ideas.129 However, unlike Marx and Engels, Tkatchev, like many populists, regarded workers and peasants as belonging to the same social group.

What was missed by both Pokrovsky and Venturi was Tkatchev’s debt to Lassalle. Like many Russian socialists, Tkatchev came to Lassalle through Spielhagen.130Even in 1869, before his emigration, he stressed Lassalle’s central etatist idea, namely, that political reform must precede social reform111 Although accepting the main principles of Marxism, Tkatchev rejected Marxist strategy in Russia because of the basic difference between Russia and the West, which he felt should be accepted by Marx and Engels if they wished to be consistent. Indeed, Tkatchev was perfectly right from a Marxist point of view when, in an open letter to Engels, he stressed that “the situation of our country is completely unique. It has nothing in common with the situation of any Western European country.”132Essentially, Marx and Engels claimed the same thing, advancing the theory of the Asiatic mode of production and of Russia as a semi-Asiatic country.

The reason why Tkatchev stressed this basic difference was not only because of the economic gap. According to Tkatchev, as a result of agelong slavery and oppression, the average Russian developed endurance, servility and the slave instinct, hypocrisy, and the ability to control any manifestation of his or her feelings. These qualities corrupted and made the average Russian helpless.133 But if one remembers what was said about the Russians by Marx and Engels, one cannot see any difference between their definition and Tkatchev’s.

Tkatchev came to the following logical conclusion: Nobody can rely on the Russians in any revolution from below, as in Europe. A revolutionary elite must take power through conspiracy, and only then can it engage in the necessary reeducation of the Russian people in order to liberate them from the legacy of slavery and oppression, to release their energy.134 The idea of revolution through political conspiracy belonged to the French socialist Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881), and Bolsheviks were often accused of Blanquism.135 If so, Tkatchev was the direct predecessor of Lenin.

In spite of his low regard for the Russian people, Tkatchev was deeply nationalist. Contrary to Herzen and Bakunin, who admired the Russian and Slav characters as they were, Tkatchev dreamed only of making Russians the equal of the people of Western nations, or even their superiors.

“Those who flatter their people do not respect it,” Tkatchev said,136 which was exactly Lenin’s attitude toward the Russians. Let us look, for example, at one of Lenin’s many invectives against the Russian national character:

It is the worst feature in the Russian character, which expresses Itself in enervation and flabbiness. It is important, not only to begin but to carry on and hold out; that is what we Russians are not good at Only by long training, through a proletarian disciplined struggle against all wavering and vacillation, only through such endurance can the Russian working masses be brought to rid themselves of this bad habit.137

Tkatchev decisively rejected the very principle of nationality, which, according to him, was incompatible with socialist revolution.138 One can easily see, however, that this ostensible internationalism is potentially an etatist Russian nationalism. Tkatchev, for example, categorically rejected any quest for Ukrainian nationalism. The revolution, as conceived by Tkatchev, was to be a specifically Russian enterprise, which would claim its administrative authority over the former territory of the Russian empire.

Indeed, rejection of Ukrainian nationalism amounts to Russian monopoly of the future socialist state.

Tiutchev’s magazine Nabat, published when he was an emigrant, was also explicitly anti-Semitic, another manifestation of his nationalism. He Inherit«! Bakunin’s anti-Semitic legacy: Nabat regarded Jews as a collective entity and as the ally of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists who entered into a conspiracy against poor peasants. In short, Jews were declared to be the main enemy of the peasants.139

Tkatchev then developed the theory of a two-stage revolution, a continuation of Herzen’s last concept. The feat stage would use only destructive power directed at annihilatingthe enemies of the revolution. In the second stage, this power must be bridled and a new order created that would be essentially conservative as it would be based on a healthy popular conservatism, which would be developed and perfected.190

Tkatchev was deeply influenced by Machiavelli, and this influence later became a leading intellectual influence among etatist Russian socialists. He said that Machiavelli liberates from “the heavy burden of scholarship, he provides us with a reasonable and sober opinion on phenomena which in his time nobody, and in other times only a few, could have any clear notion of”191

Tkatchev favored Russian military defeat as the starting point of a revolution. He advanced this point during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877— 1878, saying, “War creates a lot of the most favorable conditions for a successful revolutionary explosion.”191 By the way, it was not only Tiutchev’s privilege to base his hopes on a war in order to encourage a possible revolution. The senior Russian diplomat Nikolai Tcharykov (1855-1930) remarked that in 1877 “the conviction grew among the intelligentsia of Russia that if the war they were doing their best to bring on took place, it would be followed in Russia by either a Constitution or a revolution.”193

Engels furiously and arrogantly attacked Tkatchev. In an insulting reply to him in 1875, he completely dismissed Tiutchev’s theories.199 It is perfectly understandable what bothered Marx and Engels. Only several years after the dash with Bakunin, another Russian was appealing for a self-contained Russian revolution, with geopolitical implications difficult to forecast Tkatchev was not a populist, he was not obsessed by Russian primitive communism, and he did not worship Russian backwardness. He was an etatist, and could not his revolution be a more dangerous challenge on the part of the Russian and Slav world to Germany than the present Russia?

Some historians commenting on the Engels-Tkatchev controversy, have regarded it as Marxist dogmatism versus Tkatchev’s realism.195 In fact, Engels was no less realistic than Tkatchev in his polemics, but he simply obscured his real reservation, justifying his political concern by dogmatic arguments. Nikolai Berdiaev was wrong in accusing Engels of utopianism in this instance.196 Tibor Szamuely essentially repeated Berdiaev’s argument, saying that “Marxist dogma has served only to obfuscate the basic problems of the Russian revolution, the problem posed so starkly and uncompromisingly by Tkatchev.”147 Both Berdiaev and Szamuely were wrong to blame Marx and Engels for incompetence. Marx and Engels understood Russia well enough, but in their value system they had a different concept of the Russian social revolution. According to them, it ought to be followed by German cultural colonization, and they dismissed any Russian quest for an independent social revolution as politically dangerous.

Nevertheless, in his official capacity, Pokrovsky stressed Lenin’s dependence on Tkatchev, though he claimed that Lenin was not Tkatchev’s pupiL14® I will return to this subject later.

The last tribute to Tkatchev was paid by the Soviet historian Fedor Nesterov, who praised him for his struggle in defense of “centralism, hierarchy, and military discipline in a revolutionary organization.”149

The Russian Machiavellian: Sergei Netchacv

Tkatchev’s tribute to Machiavelli was not unnoticed in Russia, as I have mentioned before. In the second half of the 1870s, there was a new, far- reaching mutation. A young Russian socialist, Sergei Netchaev (1847—1882),150 injected Machievelllanlsm from below, as Anthony D’Agostino called it,141 into Russian revolutionary thought. It was not his main idea that a small dedicated group of revolutionaries should take political power, as had already been suggested by Blanqui and then by Tkatchev. His main idea was to reply on absolute immorality as revolutionary ammunition. He explicitly referred to Machiavelli and also to the Jesuits—it was widely believed that they practiced absolute immorality as welL

According to Netchaev, who was supported by Tkatchev and temporarily by Bakunin, there was no action that could not be used for the sake of revolution, including the betrayal of personal feiende and committed revolutionaries, penetration into the police as double agents, and so on. Public opinion must be ignored completely, any dogmatism must be rejected. Everything that promotes revolution is moral. We can quote from his so- called Catechism of the Revolutionist:

1. The revolutionary is a dedicated man. He has no interests of his own, no affairs, no feelings, no attachments, no belongings, not even a name. Everything in him is absorbed by a single exclusive interest, a single thought, a single passion—d the revolution.
2. In the very depths of his being, not only in words but also in deeds, he has broken every tie with the civil order and the entire cultured world, with all its laws, proprieties, social conventions and its ethical rules. He is an implacable enemy of this world, and if he continues to live in it, that is only to destroy it more effectively.
3. The revolutionary despises all doctrinairism and has rejected the mundane sciences, leavingthem to future generations. He knows of only one science, the science of destruction. To this end, and this end alone, he will study mechanics, physics, chemistry, and perhaps medicine. To this end he will study day and night the living science: people, their characters and circumstances and all the features of the present social order at all possible level. His sole and constant object is the destruction of this vile order.

4. He despises public opinion. He despises and abhors the existing social ethic in all its manifestations and expressions. For him, everything is moral which assists the triumph of revolution. Immoral and criminal is everything which stands in its way. . .

8. The revolutionary considers his friend and holds dear only a person who has shown himself in practice to be as much a revolutionary as he himself The extent of his friendship, devotion and other obligations towards his comrade is determined only by their degree of usefulness in the practical work of total revolutionary destruction. . .  

13.       The revolutionary enters Into the world of the state, of class and of so-called culture, and live* in it only because he has faith in its speedy and total destruction. He it not a revolutionary if he feels pity for anything In this world. If he it able to, he must face the annihilation of a situation, of a relationship or of any person who it a part of this world— everything and everyone must be equally odious to him. All the worse for him if he hat family, friends and loved ones in this world; he it no revolutionary if they can stay his hand.

14.       Aiming at merciless destruction the revolutionary can and sometimes even must live within society while pretending to be quite other than what he it. The revolutionary must penetrate everywhere, among all the lowest and the middle classes, into the houses of commerce, the church, the mansions of the rich, the world of the bureaucracy, the military and of literature, the Third Section [the Secret Police] and even the Winter Palace.152

Netchaev also provided practical examples of a new revolutionary immorality. He betrayed his friends to the police, he forged documents, and he misrepresented himself as the leader of an immense revolutionary organization that actually was nonexistent. He issued membership cards of this organization, using four- or five-figure numbers for these cards, and with this forged identity, he raised money and looked for political support. He initiated the assassination of an innocent student by his circle in order to exercise absolute domination over its members. He calculated that by having shared the responsibility for this assassination, the members of his circle would be in constant fear of exposure. Like Bakunin, Netchaev appealed for the use of brigands to raise money as brigands were regarded as the only genuine revolutionaries.

Netchaev was condemned by the majority of the Russian revolutionaries and was also immortalized by Dostoevsky in The Possessed. A committed fanatic, Netchaevthed in prison. He left an extremely Important legacy to Russian socialism: Wittingly or not, Lenin absorbed almost all Netchaev1s commandments of immorality. There is almost nothing contained in those commandments that was not imitated by Lenin or Stalin later. Moreover, there were several attempts to acknowledge Netchaev’s legacy during the first period of Soviet rule. Pokrovsky acknowledged that the plan of the 1917 revolution coincided exactly with the plan elaborated by Netchaev’s circle.153 Less than a year after the Bolshevik revolution, Pravdaconspicuously printed “The Catechism of the Conscious Proletarian,” hinting at Netchaev’s Catechism of the Revolutionist14

Several books were published in Russia on Netchaev in the 1920s,155 as well as one apologetic poem (1927) by Petr Oreshin (1867-1938) in which Netchaev is presented as an epic Russian hero.14 Only since the 1930s, when Stalin decided that Russian socialism’s tradition of conspiracy and terrorism was a dangerous model for his adversaries, has Netchaev been labeled an assassin and a traitor.157

Superficially, Netchaev’s Machiavellianism was only a foreign imitation: Machiavellianism was a dominant political tradition in Germany and in France in the nineteenth century. Napoleon III (1808-1873) widely relied on it in his plutocratic rule, which in 1864 became the subject of a satirical attack in Maurice Joly’s ill-fated book, Dialogue aux Enfers, later used as a blueprint for the notorious forgery, Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.158 The Prince was the model book for Prussian monarchs for a long time, and they used its wisdom extensively.

What was so special about Netchaev? Machiavellianism was a rationalization of the rules ofthe political struggle practiced in every age by all nations (for example, the diplomacy of ancient China). Netchaev’s originality lay in the fact that he used Machiavellianism as a cover for Russian underworld rules, relying on a specific Russian tradition.

Since the seventeenth century, one can see in Russian history strong movements whose leaders had forged identities and claimed that they were tsars or their legitimate heirs who had miraculously escaped assassination. Even in the sixteenth century, a young monk of obscure origin, Grigory Otrepiev, successfully posed as Ivan the Terrible’s allegedly assassinated son who had in fact been saved by faithful followers. This young man succeeded in ruling Russia for a short time until he was killed in 1606 and entered history as the False Dimitry. Two other “false Dimitries” followed him, but they were less successful. A peasant uprising in 1773-1775 was led by a Don Cossack, Emelian Pugatchev (1742-1775), who posed as Peter III (1728- 1762), claiming he had not died but had survived miraculously. Pugatchev surrounded himself with other Cossacks and brigands who posed (rather precariously) as well-known Russian princes and generals. The memory of these political forgeries was still fresh in Russia, and Netchaev’s forgery of nonexistent organizations simply followed this old Russian tradition.

What was more important from the viewpoint of what was to happen later was that Netchaev justified the revolutionaries’ acting as police double agents. The populists had already followed this advice and had their “mole,” Nikolai Kletotchnikov (1846-1883), who successfully penetrated the Russian political police.

One might argue that although Netchaev was inspired by Machlavelli, or even by Russian tradition, he could have arrived at the same practical conclusions on Marxist premises. Indeed, Marx declared that morality was a class phenomenon, and as such he relativized it Everything that could profit one or another class was regarded as moral. Therefore, Marxism theoretically destroyed the absolute and universal meaning of morality.

The problem was only in cultural constraints. Declaring the relativity of morality, Marx at least did not practice immorality on his friends. It was not a matter of principle but of the education he received. Netchaev, a young “barbarian” as Herzen and Bakunin would have liked to call him, did not have such constraints; he was not educated, and he had not been brought up in the “philistine, bourgeois, and rotten” West In fact, Marx and Engels were Inconsistent in their blame of Netchaev. If they had been consistent, they would have agreed that Netchaevism could also have been a logical result of their own relativization of morality.

There are too many Implications of this revolutionary immorality, Including ideological ones. Any idea might be used, any movement might be supported, any political step might be justified. The Bolsheviks later enjoyed the tacit support of the Russian political police; many double agents acted in the Bolshevik party. The Bolsheviks also took advantage of German money during World War I. They Integrated the former radical right, they betrayed revolutions and Communist parties. Everything was justified if it served the final goal.


1. N. Ören, ed., When Patterns Change: Turning Point! in International Relations (New York and Jerusalem, 1984), p. 145. Ci J. Danlloff, Russland im Weltkriege (Jena, 1925), p. 1; W. Laquer, Russia and Germany (London, 1965); and R. Pipe*, U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Däente (Boulder, Colo., 1981).
2. See H. Rollin, L’Apocalypse de пôtre temps (Paris, 1939), and O. Subcelny, “Peter Testament,” Slavic Review, no. 4 (1974).
3. See, lfr example, D. Groh, Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas (Neuwied Rhein, 1961).
4. See, (or example, F. Fisher, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London, 1967), p. 33.
5. L. Poliakov, The History of Anti-Semitism (London, 1975), 3:380.
6. G. Alexinsky, Modem Russia (London, 1913), p. 32.
7. M. Psleologue, An Ambassador’s Memoirs (London, 1923), 1:75.
8. M. Gorev, Izvestia, August 28, 1928.
9. A. Koaarev, Pravda, June 19, 1929.
10. K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke (Berlin, 1958-1968), 38:160.
11. E. Dillon, The Edipse of Russia (London, 1918), p. 34. C£ Y. Soloviev, Vospominania diplomata (Moscow, 1959), pp. 263-264.
12. L. Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution (New York, 1977), p. 78.
13. Ibid., pp. 78-80.
14. N. Berdiaev, Filasofia neravenstva (Paris, 1971), p. 19.
15. F. Nesterov, Sviaz’ vremen (Moscow, 1980), p. 60.
16. Quoted from M. B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism (New York, 1956), p. 6. See also I. Kirillov, Tretii Rim (Moscow, 1914).
17. Quoted from T. Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia (London, 1955), 1:230.
18. Ibid., p. 346.
19. Plamenatz, in E. Kamenka, ed., Nationalism (Canberra, 1976), p. 27. C£ D. Likhatchev, “Natsional’noe edlnoobrazie 1 natsional’noe ramoobrazie,” Russkoia literatury, no. 1 (1968); H. Seton-Watson, Nationalism and Communism (London, 1964); and B. Shaffer, Nationalism (London, 1955).
20. Plamenatz, in Kamenka, Nationalism, p. 27.
21. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
22. Ibid., p. 34.
23. Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, p. 28.
24. B. Nolde, Yuri Samarin i ego vremia (Patis, 1926), p. 45.
25. Ibid., pp. 47-48. The references to December 14 allude to an unsuccessful coup d’ftat on December 14, 1825.
26. I. Berlin, Russian Thinker] (London, 1978), p. 186. For Herzen’s influence in Russia, see also V. Meahchersky, Moi vospominania (St. Petersburg, 1897-1912), I: 67-69.
27. D. Pasmanik, Russkaia revolutsia i evreiskii vopros (Berlin, 1923), p. 65.
28. F. Nesterov, Pravda, March 24, 1980.
29. M. Malla, Herren and the Birth of Russian Socialism (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 336.
30. Croh, Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas, p. 279, and A. Herzen, “S togo berega,” in Herzen, Sobranie sotdiinenii (Moscow, 1954-1966), 6:135.
31. Quoted from T. Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (London, 1974), p. 201.
32. Ibid., p. 202.
33. Herzen, “S togo berega,” p. 13.
34. A. Herzen,“0 razvitii revolutsionnykh idei v Rossii,” in Herzen, Sobranie sotdiinenii, 7:240, 248.
35. N. Berdlaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (Ann Arbor, Mich., I960), p. 147.
36. Herzen, “O razvitii revolutsionnykh idei.”
37. Ibid., pp. 48, 15.
38. A. Herzen, “Russkie nemtsy i nemetskie russkie,” in Herzen, Sobranie sotdiinenii, 14:151.
39. Ibid., p. 148.
40. Ibid., p. 155.
41. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
42. Herzen, “O razvitii revolutsionnykh idei,” p. 145.
43. Ibid., p. 146.
44. Ibid., p. 172.
45. Ibid., p. 253.
46. A. Haxthausen, The Russian Empire (London, 1968); cf. Croh, Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas, p. 202.
47. M. Hess, Briefwechsel (The Hague, 1959), pp. 244-246.
48. W. Baczkowsky, Towards an Understanding of Russia (Jerusalem, 1947), p. 44.
49. A. Herzen, “K staromu tovarishchu,” in Herzen, Sobranie sotshinenii, vol. 20, pt. 2, p. 590.
50. K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works (New York, 1975-), 6:495.
51. Ibid., pp. 502-503.
52. M. Drachkovitch, Les socialism« français et allemand et la problbme de !e guerre (Geneva, 1953), p. 221.
53. Cf. U. Melotti, Marx and the Third World (London, 1977).
54. Ibid., p. 114.
55. Cf. Drachkovitch, Les socialism« français, p. 223.
56. J. Daniel, Ha-leumiut she gavra al Marx (Ramat Gan, 1977), p. 53.
57. D. Riazanov, Otcherki po istorii marksigma (Moscow, 1923), p. 222.
58. Marx and Engels, Collected Works, 2:277.
59. Ibid., 3:515.
60. Ibid., 12:167.
61. Ibid., 12:371.
62. Ibid., 12:386. Henry Palmerston (1784-1865), a British statesman, served frequently as foreign minister and then as prime minister from 1830 to 1865.
63. Ibid., 12:476.
64. Ibid., 14:156-157.
65. К. Man and F. Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe (Glencoe, Ш., 1952), p. 106. Kanmsln refers to Nikolai Karamsin (1766-1826).
66. Ibid., p. 203.
67. Ibid., p. 26.
68. M. Ralnmin, Izbranrtye sotdunenia (Moscow, 1920-1922), 2:95; L. Orton, The Prague Slav Congress of 1848 (Boulder, Cola, 1978), pp. 94-96.
69. Deviatyi (IX) s’ezd RKP(bJ (Moscow, I960), p. 198.
70. Man and Engels, Collected Works, 39:523.
71. Man and Engels, Russian Menace to Europe, pp. 236-237.
72. Ibid., p. 229.
73. Bakunin, Izbranniye sotchinenia, 3:60.
74. E.g., A. Lehning, M. Bakounine et Ies autres (Paris, 1976), pp. 134-137.
75. M. Bakunin, The Confession of Mikhail Bakunin, ed. R. Howes and D. Orton (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), pp. 89, 98, 99.
76. M. Bakunin, Pis’ma Herzcnu i Ogarevu (St Petersburg, 1906), pp. 111-188.
77. Bakunin, Confession, p. 89.
78. E.g., Bakunin, Izbrannye sotchinenia, 2:95.
79. Szarmiely, Russian Tradition, p. 373; Y. Steklov, History of the First International (Leningrad, 1928), p. 166.
80. E.g., Steklov, History of the First International, and Riazanov, Otcherki po istorii marksizma, p. 222.
81. E.g., M. Ralnmin, “Austro-Germanskala lmperia 1 sotsial’naia revolutsia,” in Bakunin, Izbrannye sotchinenia, voL 2, and Bakunin, “Gosudarstvermoet’ 1 anarkhla,” In Ibid., vol. 1.
82. Bakunin, “Knuto-Germanakaia lmperia,” p. 83.
83. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
84. Ibid., p. 88.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
87. Ibid., p. 95.
88. Ibid., pp. 162-163.
89. Ra İninin, “Gosudarstvennoat’ i anarkhia.”
90. Ibid., p. 95.
91. Ibid., p. 87.
92. Ibid., p. 132.
93. Ibid., p. 202.
94. Ibid., p. 195.
95. J.Teller, Scapegoat of Revolution (New York, 1954), pp. 58-60.
96. E.g., Drechkovitch, Les socialismes françaises, p. 220.
97. Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, p. 31.
98. C£ Мааагук, Spirit of Russia; B. Mouravief, “L’hlstoire a-t-elk un sens?” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 4 (1954); Petrovich, Emergence af Russian Panslavism; A. von Schelting, Russland und Europa (Bern, 1948); H. Kohn, Panslavism (New York, I960); and R. McMaster, Danilevsky: A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).
99. B. Nikolaevsky, “O kornyack sovetskogo imperialisms,” Sotsialistucheskii vestnik, no. 2 (1954).
100. N. Danilevsky, Rossia i Evropa (St Petersburg, 1889), p. 131.
101. See O. Bauer, Natsionalny vopras (N.p., 1909), p. 283.
102. Danilevsky, Rossia i Evropa, p. 133.
103. Ibid., p. 201. 
104. Ibid., p. 208.
105. Petrovich, Emergence of Russian Panslavism, pp. 258-260.
106. See F. Venturi, Roots of Revolution (New York, 1972); Szamuely, Riusian Tradition; and I. Berlin, Russian Thinkers.
107- I. Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 213.
108. Cf. Szamuely, Russian Tradition; Venturi, Roots of Revolution; ]. Polevoi, Zarox zhenie marksisma v Rossii (Moecow, 1959); and S. Schwartz, “Populism and Early Russian Mandam,” in E. Simmons, ed, Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought (Cambridge, Maas., 1955).
109. Marx and Engels, Russian Menace to Europe, p. 228.
110. Ibid., p. 233.
111. Szamuety, Russian Tradition, p. 221.
112. Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p. 622.
113. V. Khoros, Narodnitcheskaia ideologia i marksizm (Moscow, 1972), p. 196.
114. E.g., E. Bernstein, Lassalle as a Social Reformer (London, 1893); G. Brandes, F. LatutUe (New York, 1911); G. Plekhanov, Sotchinenia (Moscow, 1923-1927), 4:5- 52; P. Vinogradskata, F. Lassalle (Moecow, 1926); D. Zaslavsky, lassalle (Leningrad, 1925); and A. Dzhlvelegov, “Bismarck 1 Lassalle,” Natchalo (1899).
115. F. Spielhagen, In Reih’ und Glied (Berlin, 1866).
116. Herzen, “К staromu tovariahehu,” p. 591.
117. Zaslavsky, Lassalle.
118. V. Debogorii-Mokrievitch, Vaspominania (Paris, 1894), p. 14.
119. Zaslavsky, Lassalle, p. 115.
120. I. Stepanov, Ot revolutsii к revolutsü (Moscow, 1925), p. 43.
121. L. Deutsch, Rol’ evreev v russkom revolutsionnom dvizhenii (Berlin, 1923), p. 198; and I. Getzler, Martov (Cambridge, 1967), p. 15.
122. I. Maisky, Before the Storm (London, 1943), pp. 98-100.
123. Baron (V. Btbineiahvlll), Za tchetvert’ veka (Moscow, 1931), p. 26.
124. Z. Zeman and W. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution (London, 1965), pp. 45, 66.
125. K. Albrecht, Der verratene Sozialismus (Berlin, 1939), p. 36.
126. A. Gorkin, “Dva mira,” Narodnoe pravo, nos. 3-4 (1919), pp. 66-67.
127. E.g., K. Kautsky, Terrorism and Communism (London, 1920), p. 156, and S. Leonhard, Gestohlenes Leben (Frankfurt am Main, 1956), pp. 787, 802.
128. M. Pokrovsky, Russia in World History, ed R. Szporluk (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970), pp. 180-182.
129. Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p. 395.
130. Tkatchev, Izbrannyc sotchinenia (Moscow, 1932), 1:173.
131. Ibid, 1:424.
132. Ibid, 3:89.
133. P. Tkatchev, “Nashi illluzll,” Nabat, nos., 2-3 (1876).
134. P. Tkatchev, “Narod 1 revolutsia,” Nabat, no. 4 (1876).
135. G. Plekhanov, My i ony (St Petersburg, 1907).
136. Tkatchev, “Nashi tlliuzii.”
137. June 13, 1920, ln V. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow, 1960-1971), 31: 173-174.
138. P. Tkatchev, “Revolutsia i printsip natsional’nasti,” Nabat (1878), p. 84.
139. P. Tkatchev, “Iz Belorussii,” Nabat, no. 4 (1876), p. 8.
140. Tkatchev, “Narod i revolutsia.”
141. Tkatchev, Izbrannye sotchinenia, 1:72.
142. P. Tkatchev, “Volna i revolutsia,” Nabat, nos. 3-6 (1877), p. 5. 
143. N. Tcharykov, Glimpses of High Politics (New York, 1931), p. 93.
144. The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. R. Tucker (New York, 1972), pp. 589-599.
145. Szamuely, Russian Tradition, p. 307.
146. Berdlaev, Origin of Russian Communism, pp. 94-106.
147. Samuely, Russian Tradition, p. 307.
148. Pokrovsky, Russia in World History p. 181.
149. Nesterov, Sviaz’ vrcmcn, p. 177.
150. See M. Confino, Violence dans la violence: Le tUbat Bakounine-Nefaev (Peris, 1973), end M. Prawdin, The Unmentionable Nechaev (London, 1961).
151. A. D’Agostino, Marxism and the Russian Anarchists (Sen Francisco, 1977), p. 43.
152. Quoted from M. Confine, The Daughter of a Revolutionary (London, 1974), pp. 224-227.
153. Prawdin, The Unmentionable Nechaev, p. 187.
154. Pravda, August 4, 1918.
155. Prawdin, The Unmentionable Nechaev, p. 188.
156. Quoted In O. Beskin, Kulatshaia khudozhestuennaia literatura i opportun- istitcheskaia kritika (Moscow, 1930), p. 26.
157. E.g., V. Shubkin, “Neopallmaia kupina,” Nash Sovremennik, no. 12 (1981), p. 177.
158. Cf. Rallin, L’Apocalypse de nötre temps; V. Burtsev, Protokoly sionskikh mudretsov (Paris, 1938); Y. Delevsky, Protokoly sionskikh mudretsov (Berlin, 1923); and N. Cohn, Warrant for Genocide (London, 1967).die